Abstract. Lattice-based group signature is an active research topic in recent years. Since the pioneering work by Gordon, Katz and Vaikuntanathan (Asiacrypt 2010), eight other schemes have been proposed, providing various improvements in terms of security, efficiency and functionality. However, most of the existing constructions work only in the static setting where the group population is fixed at the setup phase. The only two exceptions are the schemes by Langlois et al. (PKC 2014) that handles user revocations (but new users cannot join), and by Libert et al. (Asiacrypt 2016) which addresses the orthogonal problem of dynamic user enrollments (but users cannot be revoked).
Introduction
Group signature, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [15] , is a fundamental anonymity primitive which allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the whole group. Yet, users are kept accountable for the signatures they issue since a tracing authority can identify them should the need arise. There have been numerous works on group signatures in the last quarter-century.
Ateniese et al. [2] proposed the first scalable instantiation meeting the security properties that can be intuitively expected from the primitive, although clean security notions were not available yet at that time. Bellare et al. [4] filled this gap by providing strong security notions for static groups, in which the group population is fixed at the setup phase. Subsequently, Kiayias and Yung [25] and Bellare et al. [5] established the models capturing the partially dynamic setting, where users are able to join the group at any time, but once they have done so, they cannot leave the group. Sakai et al. [47] strengthened these models by suggesting the notion of opening soundness, guaranteeing that a valid signature only traces to one user. Efficient schemes satisfying these models have been proposed in the random oracle model [43, 17] and in the standard model [21, 34] .
One essential functionality of group signatures is the support for membership revocation. Enabling this feature in an efficient manner is quite challenging, since one has to ensure that revoked users are no longer able to sign messages and the workloads of other parties (managers, non-revoked users, verifiers) do not significantly increase in the meantime. Several different approaches have been suggested [10, 12, 50, 42, 6] to address this problem, and notable pairing-based constructions supporting both dynamic joining and efficient revocation were given in [40, 33, 32] . Very recently, Bootle et al. [7] pointed out a few shortcomings of previous models, and put forward stringent security notions for fully dynamic group signatures. They also demonstrated a construction satisfying these notions based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, following a generic transformation from a secure accountable ring signature scheme [8] .
Another interesting functionality of group signatures that we consider in this work is deniability, suggested by Ishida et al. [22] . It allows the tracing authority to provide a digital evidence that a given group user did not generate a signature in question. In [22] , Ishida et al. discussed various situations in which such functionality helps to protect the privacy of users. For instance, suppose that the entrace/exit control of a building is implemented using a group signature scheme, and the police wants to check whether a suspect was in this building at the time of a crime. If the police asks the tracing authority to reveal the signers of all signatures generated during that time period, then this will seriously violate the privacy of innocent users. In such situation, deniable group signatures make it possible to prove that the signer of a given signature is not the suspect, while still keeping the signer's identity secret. As shown by Ishida et al. [22] , the main technical challenge towards realizing the deniability functionality consists of constructing a zero-knowledge proof/argument that a given ciphertext does not decrypt to a particular message. Such a mechanism is non-trivial to realize in general, but Ishida et al. [22] managed to achieve it from pairing-based assumptions.
For the time being, existing group signature schemes offering full dynamicity and/or deniability all rely on number-theoretic assumptions which are vulnerable to quantum attacks [48] . To avoid putting all eggs in one basket, it is thus encouraging to consider instantiations based on alternative, post-quantum foundations, e.g., lattice assumptions. In view of this, let us now look at the topic of lattice-based group signatures.
Lattice-based group signatures. Lattice-based cryptography has been an exciting research area since the seminal works of Regev [45] and Gentry et al. [19] . Along with other primitives, lattice-based group signature has received noticeable attention in recent years. The first scheme was introduced by Gordon, Katz and Vaikuntanathan [20] whose solution produced signature size linear in the number of group users N . Camenisch et al. [13] then extended [20] to achieve anonymity in the strongest sense. Later, Laguillaumie et al. [26] put forward the first scheme with the signature size logarithmic in N , at the cost of relatively large parameters. Simpler and more efficient solutions with O(log N ) signature size were subsequently given by Nguyen et al. [44] and Ling et al. [36] . Libert et al. [30] obtained substantial efficiency improvements via a construction based on Merkle trees which eliminates the need for GPV trapdoors [19] . More recently, a scheme supporting message-dependent opening (MDO) feature [46] was proposed in [31] . All the schemes mentioned above are designed for static groups.
The only two known lattice-based group signatures that have certain dynamic features were proposed by Langlois et al. [27] and Libert et al. [28] . The former is a scheme with verifier-local revocation (VLR) [6] , which means that only the verifiers need to download the up-to-date group information. The latter addresses the orthogonal problem of dynamic user enrollments (but users cannot be revoked). To achieve those partially dynamic functionalities, both of the proposals have to incorporate relatively complicated mechanisms 1 and both heavily rely on lattice trapdoors.
The discussed above situation is somewhat unsatisfactory, given that the full dynamicity feature is highly desirable in most applications of group signatures (e.g., protecting the privacy of commuters in public transportation), and it has been achieved based on number-theoretic assumptions. This motivates us to work on fully dynamic group signatures from lattices. Besides, considering that the journey to partial dynamicity in previous works [27, 28] was shown not easy, we ask ourselves an inspiring question: Can we achieve full dynamicity with ease? Furthermore, given that deniability is an attractive and non-trivial functionality [22] , can we also realize it with ease in the context of lattice-based group signatures? At the end of the day, it is good to solve an open research question, but it would be even better and more exciting to do this in a simple way. To make it possible, we will likely need some new and insightful ideas.
Our Results and Techniques. Our main contribution is the first fully dynamic group signature from lattices. The scheme satisfies the strong security requirements put forward by Bootle et al. [7] , under the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumptions. As in all previous lattice-based group signatures, our scheme is analyzed in the random oracle model. Additionally, we incorporate the deniability functionality suggested by Ishida et al. [22] Table 1 . Comparison of known lattice-based group signatures, in terms of efficiency and functionality. The comparison is done based on two governing parameters: security parameter λ and the maximum expected number of group users N = 2 ℓ . As for the scheme from [27] , R denotes the number of revoked users at the epoch in question. In the last column, "⋆" means that the respective scheme can directly achieve the deniability feature via our technique, while "?" indicates that we do not know how to do so for the respective scheme.
For a security parameter parameter λ and maximum expected number of group users N , our scheme features signature size O(λ·log N ) and group public key size O(λ 2 + λ · log N ). The user's secret key has bit-size O(λ) + log N . At each epoch when the group information is updated, the verifiers only need to download an extra O(λ) bits in order to perform verification of signatures 2 , while each active signer only has to download O(λ · log N ) bits. In Table 1 , we give a detailed comparison of our scheme with known lattice-based group signatures, in terms of efficiency and functionality. The full dynamicity feature is achieved with a very reasonable cost and without having to rely on lattice trapdoors. Somewhat surprisingly, our scheme even produces shorter signatures than the scheme from [30] -which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based group signature known to date. Furthermore, these results are obtained in a relatively simple manner, thanks to three main ideas/techniques discussed below.
Our starting point is the scheme [30] , which works in the static setting. Instead of relying on trapdoor-based ordinary signatures as in prior works, the LLNW scheme employs on a SIS-based Merkle tree accumulator. For a group of N = 2 ℓ users, the manager chooses uniformly random vectors x 0 , . . . , x N −1 ; hashes them to p 0 , . . . , p N −1 , respectively; builds a tree on top of these hash values; and publishes the tree root u. The signing key of user i consists of x i and the witness for the fact that p i was accumulated in u. When issuing signatures, the user proves knowledge of a valid pair (x i , p i ) and of the tree path from p i to u. The user also has to encrypt the binary representation bin(i) of his identity i, and prove that the ciphertext is well-formed. The encryption layer is also lattice-trapdoor-free, since it utilizes the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm [41] with Regev's LWE-based encryption scheme [45] . To upgrade the LLNW scheme directly into a fully dynamic group signature, we now let the user compute the pair (x i , p i ) on his own (for enabling non-frameability), and we employ the following three ideas/techniques.
First, we add a dynamic ingredient into the static Merkle tree accumulator from [30] . To this end, we equip it with an efficient updating algorithm with complexity O(log N ): to change an accumulated value, we simply update the values at the corresponding leaf and along its path to the root.
Second, we create a simple rule to handle user enrollment and revocation efficiently (i.e., without resetting the whole tree). Specifically, we use the updating algorithm to set up the system so that: (i)-If a user has not joined the group or has been revoked, the value at the leaf associated with him is set as 0; (ii)-When a user joins the group, that value is set as his public key p i . Our setup guarantees that only active users (i.e., who has joined and has not been revoked at the given epoch) have their non-zero public keys accumulated into the updated root. This rule effectively separates active users who can sign from those who cannot: when signing messages, the user proceeds as in the LLNW scheme, and is asked to additionally prove in zero-knowledge that p i = 0. In other words, the seemingly big gap between being fully static and being fully dynamic has been reduced to a small difference! Third, the arising question now is how to additionally prove the inequality p i = 0 in the framework of the Stern-like [49] protocol from [30] . One would naturally expect that this extra job could be done without losing too much in terms of efficiency. Here, the surprising and somewhat unexpected fact is that we can actually do it while gaining efficiency, thanks to the following simple idea. Recall that, in [30] , to prove knowledge of p i ∈ {0, 1} nk , an extension technique from [35] is employed, in which p i is extended into a vector of dimension 2nk. We note that, the authors of [35] also suggested a slightly modified version of their technique, that allows to simultaneously prove that p i ∈ {0, 1} nk and p i is nonzero while working only with dimension 2nk − 1. This intriguing tweak enables us to obtain a zero-knowledge protocol with slightly lower communication cost, and hence, group signatures with slightly smaller size than in [30] .
Another problem we have to overcome is that the fully dynamic setting requires a proof of correct opening, which boils down to proving correct decryption for Regev's encryption scheme [45] . It involves modular linear equations with bounded-norm secrets, and can be handled using Stern-like techniques from [35, 28] . Now, to equip the obtained fully dynamic group signature scheme with the deniability functionality, we first incorporate Ishida et al.'s notion of deniability [22] into Bootle et al.'s model [7] . Then we describe how to make our scheme deniable, via a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge that a given Regev ciphertext [45] does not decrypt to a given message. The latter reduces to proving knowledge of a non-zero vector b ∈ {−1, 0, 1} ℓ satisfying a modular linear equation, where b is the difference between the result of decryption and the given message. This in turn can be handled by developing the above method for proving inequality in the framework of Stern's protocol.
To summarize, we solve the prominent open question of achieving full dynamicity in the field of lattice-based group signatures. The scheme can be easily extended to a deniable group signature. Moreover, our solution is simple and comparatively efficient. Our results, while not yielding truly practical schemes, would certainly help to enrich the field and bring lattice-based group signatures one step closer to practice.
Remarks. This article is the full, extended version of [37] , published in the proceedings of ACNS 2017. In comparison with [37] , the present version additionally introduces the deniability feature to the obtained fully dynamic group signature scheme, and provides details of all the security proofs.
Organization. In Section 2, we recall some background on fully dynamic group signatures and lattice-based cryptography. Section 3 develops an updatable Merkle tree accumulator. Our main scheme is constructed and analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we demonstrate how to achieve deniability. Some details are deferred to the appendix.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this paper, all vectors are column vectors. The concatenation two column vectors x ∈ R m and y ∈ R k is denoted by (x y) ∈ R m+k for simplicity. Let · and · ∞ be the Euclidean (ℓ 2 ) norm and infinity (ℓ ∞ ) norm of a vector respectively. For a ∈ R, log a denotes logarithm of a with base 2. Denote [m] as the set {1, 2, · · · , m}.
Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
We recall the definition and security notions of fully dynamic group signatures (FDGS) presented by Bootle et al. [7] . An FDGS scheme involves the following entities: a group manager GM that determines who can join the group, a tracing manager TM who can open signatures, and a set of users who are potential group members. Users can join/leave the group at the discretion of GM. We assume GM will publish some information info τ regularly associated with a distinct index τ (referred as epoch hereafter). Without loss of generality, assume there is one-to-one correspondence between information and the associated epoch. The information describes changes of the group, e.g., current group members or members that are excluded from the group. We assume the published group information is authentic. By comparing current group information with previous one, it allows any party to identify revoked users at current epoch. For simplicity assume τ 1 < τ 2 if info τ1 is published before info τ2 , i.e., the epoch preserves the order in which the corresponding group information was published. In existing models, the keys of authorities are supposed to be generated honestly; while in [7] , Bootle et al. consider a stronger model where the keys of authorities can be maliciously generated by the adversary.
Syntax of fully dynamic group signatures. An FDGS scheme is a tuple of following polynomial-time algorithms.
GSetup(λ) → pp. On input security parameter λ, this algorithm generates public parameters pp. GKgen GM (pp), GKgen TM (pp) . This is an interactive protocol between the group manager GM and the tracing manager TM. If it completes successfully, algorithm GKgen GM outputs a manager key pair (mpk, msk). Meanwhile, GM initializes the group information info and the registration table reg. The algorithm GKgen TM outputs a tracing key pair (tpk, tsk). Set group public key gpk = (pp, mpk, tpk).
UKgen(pp) → (upk, usk). Given public parameters pp, this algorithm generates a user key pair (upk, usk). Correctness and security of fully dynamic group signatures. As put forward by Bootle et al. [7] , an FDGS scheme must satisfy correctness, anonymity, non-frameability, traceability and tracing soundness. Correctness demands that a signature generated by an honest and active user is always accepted by algorithm Verify, and that algorithm Trace can always identify that user, as well as produces a proof accepted by algorithm Judge. Anonymity requires that it is infeasible for any PPT adversary to distinguish signatures generated by two active users of its choice at the chosen epoch, even if it can corrupt any user, can choose the key of GM, and is given access to the Trace oracle. Non-Frameability makes sure that the adversary cannot generate a valid signature that traces to an honest user even if it can corrupt all other users, and can choose keys of both managers. Traceability ensures that the adversary cannot produce a valid signature that cannot be traced to an active user at the chosen epoch, even if it can corrupt any user and can choose the key of TM.
Tracing Soundness requires that it is infeasible to produce a valid signature that traces to two different users, even if all group users and both managers are fully controlled by the adversary. We will define these requirements using a set of experiments, in which the adversary has access to a set of oracles. The oracles use the following global variables: HUL is a list of users whose keys are generated honestly. BUL is a list of users whose secret signing keys are revealed to the adversary; CUL is a list of users whose public keys are chosen by the adversary; SL is a set of signatures that are generated by the oracle Sign; CL is a set of signatures that are generated by the oracle Chal b .
AddU(uid). This oracle adds an honest user uid to the group at current epoch.
It a proof, with respect to the epoch τ . We require that the signature is not in the list CL. GUpdate(S). This oracle allows the adversary to update the group at current epoch τ current . It is required that S is a set of active users at current epoch.
We also need the following polynomial-time algorithm in security experiments to ease composition. IsActive(info τ , reg, uid) → 0/1: It outputs 1 if this user is active at epoch τ and 0 otherwise.
We refer the readers to [7] for detailed descriptions of the above oracles. 
Definition 1. For any security parameter λ and any PPT adversary
Denote the output of GKgen TM as (tpk, tsk), and set gpk = (pp, mpk, tpk).
Denote the output of GKgen GM as (mpk, msk, info), and set gpk = (pp, mpk, tpk). 
Background on Lattices
We recall the average-case lattice problems SIS and LWE, together with their hardness results. 
e.g., [19, 39] ). Specifically, when
problem is at least as hard as SIVP γ with γ = O(n).
In the last decade, numerous SIS-based cryptographic primitives have been proposed. In this work, we will extensively employ 2 such constructions:
-Our group signature scheme is based on the Merkle tree accumulator from [30] , which is built upon a specific family of collision-resistant hash functions. -Our zero-knowledge argument systems use the statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme from [24] .
For appropriate setting of parameters, the security of the above two constructions can be based on the worst-case hardness of SIVP O(n) .
In the group signature in Section 4, we will employ the multi-bit version of Regev's encryption scheme [45] , presented in [23] . The scheme is based on the hardness of the LWE problem. If q is a prime power, χ is the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,αq , where αq ≥ 2 √ n, then LWE n,q,χ is as least as hard as SIVP O(n/α) (see [45, 38, 39] ).
Stern-like Protocols for Lattice-Based Relations
The zero-knowledge (ZK) argument systems appearing in this paper operate in the framework of Stern's protocol [49] . Let us now recall some background. This protocol was originally proposed in the context of code-based cryptography, and was later adapted into the lattice setting by Kawachi et al. [24] . Subsequently, it was empowered by Ling et al. [35] to handle the matrix-vector relations associated with the SIS and LWE problems, and further developed to design several lattice-based schemes: group signatures [27, 36, 30, 31, 28] , policybased signatures [16] and group encryption [29] .
Stern-like protocols are quite useful in the context of lattice-based privacypreserving systems, when one typically works with modular linear equations of the form i M i · x i = v mod q -where {M i } i , v are public, and one wants to prove in ZK that secret vectors {x i } i satisfy certain constraints, e.g., they have small norms and/or have coordinates arranged in a special way. The high-level ideas can be summarized as follows. If the given constraints are invariant under certain type of permutations of coordinates, then one readily uses uniformly random permutations to prove those constraints. Otherwise, one performs some pre-processings with {x i } i to reduce to the former case. Meanwhile, to prove that the modular linear equation holds, one makes use of a standard masking technique.
The basic protocol consists of 3 moves: commitment, challenge, response. If the statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme from [24] is employed in the first move, then one obtains a statistical zeroknowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) with perfect completeness, constant soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O(|w|·log q), where |w| denotes the total bit-size of the secret vectors. In many applications, the protocol is repeated κ = ω(log λ) times, for security parameter λ, to achieve negligible soundness error, and then made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [18] . In the random oracle model, this results in a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (NIZKAoK) with bit-size O(|w| · log q) · ω(log λ).
Updatable Lattice-Based Merkle Hash Trees
We first recall the lattice-based Merkle-tree accumulator from [30] , and then, we equip it with a simple updating algorithm which allows to change an accumulated value in time logarithmic in the size of the accumulated set. This updatable hash tree will serve as the building block of our construction in Section 4.
Cryptographic Accumulators
An accumulator scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms defined below.
TSetup(λ) On input security parameter λ, output the public parameter pp. TAcc pp On input a set R = {d 0 , . . . , d N −1 } of N data values, output an accumulator value u. TWitness pp On input a data set R and a value d, output ⊥ if d / ∈ R; otherwise output a witness w for the fact that d is accumulated in TAcc(R). (Typically, the size of w should be short (e.g., constant or logarithmic in N ) to be useful.) TVerify pp On input accumulator value u and a value-witness pair (d, w), output 1 (which indicates that (d, w) is valid for the accumulator u) or 0.
An accumulator scheme is called correct if for all pp ← TSetup(λ), we have
A natural security requirement for accumulators, as considered in [3, 12, 30] , says that it is infeasible to prove that a value d * was accumulated in a value u if it was not. This property is formalized as follows.
Definition 4 ([30]
). An accumulator scheme (TSetup, TAcc, TWitness, TVerify) is called secure if for all PPT adversaries A:
The LLNW Merkle-tree Accumulator
Notations. Hereunder we will use the notation x $ ← − S to indicate that x is chosen uniformly at random from finite set S. For bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we letb = 1 − b. The Merkle-tree accumulator scheme from [30] works with parameters n = O(λ), q = O(n 1.5 ), k = ⌈log 2 q⌉, and m = 2nk. The set Z q is identified by {0, . . . , q−1}. Define the "powers-of-2" matrix
nk denotes the binary representation of v. The scheme is built upon the following family of SIS-based collision-resistant hash functions.
Definition 5. The function family
, and for any (u 0 , u 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} nk × {0, 1} nk , we have:
A Merkle tree with N = 2 ℓ leaves, where ℓ is a positive integer, then can be constructed based on the function family H as follows.
, and output pp = A.
ℓ be the binary representation of j, and let d j = u j1,...,j ℓ . Form the tree of depth ℓ = log N based on the N leaves u 0,0,...,0 , . . . , u 1,1,...,1 as follows: as h A (u b1,...,bi,0 , u b1,...,bi,1 ). 2. At depth 0: The root u ∈ {0, 1} nk is defined as h A (u 0 , u 1 ). The algorithm outputs the accumulator value u.
with binary representation (j 1 , . . . , j ℓ ). Output the witness w defined as:
computed by algorithm TAcc A (R). 
Then it returns 1 if v 0 = u. Otherwise, it returns 0.
The following lemma states the correctness and security of the above Merkle tree accumulator.
Lemma 1 ([30]).
The given accumulator scheme is correct and is secure in the sense of Definition 4, assuming the hardness of the SIS ∞ n,m,q,1 problem.
An Efficient Updating Algorithm
Unlike the static group signature scheme from [30] , our fully dynamic construction of Section 4 requires to regularly edit the accumulated values without having to reconstruct the whole tree. To this end, we equip the Merkle tree accumulator from [30] with a simple, yet efficient, updating algorithm: to change the value at a given leaf, we simply modify all values in the path from that leaf to the root. The algorithm, which takes as input a bit string bin(j) = (j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j ℓ ) and a value d * ∈ {0, 1} nk , is formally described below. Given the tree in Section 3.2, algorithm TUpdate A ((j 1 , j 2 It can be seen that the provided algorithm runs in time O(ℓ) = O(log N ). In Fig. 2 , we give an illustrative example of a tree with 2 3 = 8 leaves.
Our Fully Dynamic Group Signatures from Lattices
In this section, we construct our lattice-based fully dynamic group signature and prove its security in Bootle et al.'s model [7] . We start with the LLNW scheme [30] , which works in the static setting. While other constructions of lattice-based group signatures employ trapdoorbased ordinary signature schemes (e.g., [9, 14] ) to certify users, the LLNW scheme relies on a SIS-based Merkle tree accumulator which we recalled in Section 3.2. The GM, who manages a group of N = 2 ℓ users, chooses uniformly random vectors x 0 , . . . , x N −1 ∈ {0, 1} m ; hashes them to p 0 , . . . , p N −1 ∈ {0, 1} nk , respectively; builds a tree on top of these hash values; and lets the tree root u ∈ {0, 1} nk be part of the group public key. The signing key of user i consists of x i and the witness for the fact that p i was accumulated in u. When generating group signatures, the user proves knowledge of a valid pair (x i , p i ) and of the tree path from p i to u. The user also has to encrypt the binary representation bin(i) of his identity i, and prove that the ciphertext is well-formed. The encryption layer utilizes the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm [41] with Regev's LWE-based cryptosystem, and thus, it is also lattice-trapdoor-free.
To upgrade the LLNW scheme directly into a fully dynamic group signature, some tweaks and new ideas are needed. First, to enable the non-frameability feature, we let the user compute the pair (x i , p i ) on his own. The second problem we have to consider is that Merkle hash trees seem to be a static primitive. To this end, we equip the accumulator with an efficient updating algorithm (see Section 3.3). Now, the challenging question is how to handle user enrollment and revocation in a simple manner (i.e., without having to reset the whole tree). To tackle these issues, we associate each of the N potential users with a leaf in the tree, and then use the updating algorithm to set up the system so that:
1. If a user has not joined the group or has been revoked, the value at the leaf associated with him is set as 0; 2. When a user joins the group, that value is set as his public key p i .
Our setup guarantees that only active users (i.e., who has joined and has not been revoked at the given epoch) have their non-zero public keys accumulated into the updated root. This effectively gives us a method to separate active users who can sign from those who cannot: when signing messages, the user proceeds as in the LLNW scheme, and is asked to additionally prove in ZK that p i = 0.
At this point, the arising question is how to prove the inequality p i = 0 in the framework of the Stern-like [49] protocol from [30] . One would naturally hope that this extra job could be done without losing too much in terms of efficiency. Here, the surprising and somewhat unexpected fact is that we can actually do it while gaining efficiency, thanks to a technique originally proposed in [35] .
To begin with, let B L t denote the set of all vectors in {0, 1} L having Hamming weight exactly t. In Stern-like protocols (see Section 2.4), a common technique for proving in ZK the possession of p ∈ {0, 1} nk consists of appending nk "dummy" entries to it to obtain p * ∈ B 2nk nk , and demonstrating to the verifier that a random permutation of p * belongs to the "target set" B 2nk
nk . This suffices to convince the verifier that the original vector p belongs to {0, 1} nk , while the latter cannot learn any additional information about p, thanks to the randomness of the permutation. This extending-then-permuting technique was first proposed in [35] , and was extensively used in the underlying protocol of the LLNW scheme. Now, to address our question, we will employ a modified version of this technique, which was also initially suggested in [35] . Let us think of another "target set", so that it is possible to extend p ∈ {0, 1} nk to an element of that set if and only if p is non-zero. That set is B 2nk−1 nk . Indeed, the extended vector p * belongs to B 2nk−1 nk if and only if the original vector has Hamming weight at least nk − (nk − 1) = 1, which means that it cannot be a zero-vector. When combining with the permuting step, this modification allows us to additionally prove the given inequality while working with smaller dimension. As a result, our fully dynamic scheme produces slightly shorter signatures than the original static scheme.
Finally, we remark that the fully dynamic setting requires a proof of correct opening, which boils down to proving correct decryption for Regev's encryption scheme. It involves modular linear equations with bounded-norm secrets, and can be easily handled using Stern-like techniques from [35, 28] .
Description of the Scheme
Our scheme is described as follows.
GSetup(λ). On input security parameter λ, this algorithm specifies the following:
-An expected number of potential users N = 2 ℓ = poly(λ).
-Dimension n = O(λ), prime modulus q = O(n 1.5 ), and k = ⌈log 2 q⌉. These parameters implicitly determine the "powers-of-2" matrix G ∈ Z n×nk q , as defined in Section 3. -Matrix dimensions m = 2nk for the hashing layer, and m E = 2(n + ℓ)k for the encryption layer. -An integer β = √ n · ω(log n), and a β-bounded noise distribution χ. -A hash function H FS : {0, 1} * → {1, 2, 3} κ , where κ = ω(log λ), to be modelled as a random oracle in the Fiat-Shamir transformations [18] . -Let COM : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} m → Z n q be the string commitment scheme from [24] , to be used in our zero-knowledge argument systems. N, n, q, k, m, m E , ℓ, β, χ, κ, H FS , COM, 
A}.
GKgen GM (pp), GKgen TM (pp) . The group manager GM and the tracing manager TM initialize their keys and the public group information as follows.
-GKgen GM (pp). This algorithm samples msk $ ← − {0, 1} m and computes mpk = A · msk mod q, and outputs (mpk, msk). Here, we consider mpk as an identifier of the group managed by GM who has mpk as his public key. Furthermore, as in [7, Sec. 3.3, full version], we assume that the group information board is visible to everyone, but can only be edited by a party knowing msk.
-GKgen TM (pp). This algorithm initializes the Naor-Yung double-encryption mechanism with the ℓ-bit version Regev encryption scheme. It first chooses
. Then, TM sets tsk = (S 1 , E 1 ), and tpk = (B, P 1 , P 2 ).
-TM sends tpk to GM who initializes the following:
• Table reg T is an all-zero tree at this stage, but it will be modified when a new user joins the group, or when GM computes the updated group information.) • Counter of registered users c := 0. Then, GM outputs gpk = (pp, mpk, tpk) and announces the initial group information info = ∅. He keeps T and c for himself.
UKgen(pp). Each potential group user samples usk
m , and computes upk = p = bin(A · x) mod q ∈ {0, 1} nk . Without loss of generality, we assume that every honestly generated upk is a non-zero vector. (Otherwise, the user would either pick x = 0 or accidentally find a solution to the SIS ∞ n,m,q,1 problem associated with matrix A -both happen with negligible probability.) Join, Issue . If the user with key pair (upk, usk) = (p, x) requests to join the group at epoch τ , he sends p to GM. If the latter accepts the request, then the two parties proceed as follows. 1. GM issues a member identifier for the user as uid = bin(c) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ . The user then sets his long-term signing key as gsk[c] = (bin(c), p, x).
GM performs the following updates:
-Update T by running algorithm TUpdate A (bin(c), p).
-Register the user to 
We remark that the info τ outputted at each epoch by GM is technically not part of the verification key. Indeed, as we will describe below, in order to verify signatures bound to epoch τ , the verifiers only need to download the first component u τ of size O(λ) bits. Meanwhile, each active signer only has to download the respective witness of size O(λ) · ℓ.
Sign(gpk, gsk[j], info τ , M )
. To sign message M using the group information info τ at epoch τ , the user possessing gsk[j] = (bin(j), p, x) first checks if info τ includes a witness containing bin(j). If this is not the case, return ⊥. Otherwise, the user downloads u τ and the witness of the form bin(j), (w ℓ , . . . , w 1 ) from info τ , and proceeds as follows. 1. Encrypt vector bin(j) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ twice using Regev's encryption scheme.
Namely, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, sample r i $ ← − {0, 1} mE and compute
Generate a
NIZKAoK Π gs to demonstrate the possession of a valid tuple
such that: (i) TVerify A u τ , p, bin(j), (w ℓ , . . . , w 1 ) = 1 and A · x = G · p mod q; (ii) c 1 and c 2 are both correct encryptions of bin(j) with randomness r 1 and r 2 , respectively; (iii) p = 0 nk .
Note that statements (i) and (ii) were covered by the LLNW protocol [30] . Meanwhile, statement (iii) is handled using the technique described at the beginning of this Section. We thus obtain a Stern-like interactive zero-knowledge argument system which is a slight modification of the one from [30] . The detailed description of the protocol is presented in Section 4.3. The protocol is repeated κ = ω(log λ) times to achieve negligible soundness error and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as a triple
3. Output the group signature
Verify(gpk, info τ , M, Σ). This algorithm proceeds as follows: 
As the statement involves modular linear equations with bounded-norm secrets, we can obtain a statistical zero-knowledge argument by employing the Stern-like interactive protocol from [28] . For completeness, the detailed description of the protocol is presented in Section 4.4. The protocol is repeated κ = ω(log λ) times to achieve negligible soundness error and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as a triple
5. Set uid = b ′ and output (uid, Π trace ).
Judge(gpk, uid, info τ , Π trace , M, Σ). This algorithm consists of verifying the argument Π trace w.r.t. common input (gpk, info τ , M, Σ, uid), in a similar manner as in algorithm Verify.
If Π trace does not verify, return 0. Otherwise, return 1.
Analysis of the Scheme
Efficiency. We first analyze the efficiency of the scheme described in Section 4.1, with respect to security parameter λ and parameter ℓ = log N .
-The public key gpk contains several matrices, and has bit-size O(λ 2 + λ · ℓ). Correctness. We now demonstrate that the scheme is correct with overwhelming probability, based on the perfect completeness of Stern-like protocols, and the correctness of Regev's encryption scheme. First, note that a signature Σ = (Π gs , c 1 , c 2 ) generated by an active and honest user j is always accepted by algorithm Verify. Indeed, such a user can always compute a tuple ζ = (x, p, bin(j), w ℓ , . . . , w 1 , r 1 , r 2 ) satisfying conditions (i),(ii) and (iii) in the Sign algorithm. The completeness of the underlying argument system then guarantees that Σ is always accepted by algorithm Verify.
Next, we show that algorithm Trace outputs bin(j) with overwhelming probability, and produces a proof Π trace accepted by algorithm Judge. Observe that, the decryption algorithm essentially computes
and sets the j-th bit of b ′ to be 0 if j-th entry of e is closer to 0 than to ⌊q/2⌋ and 1 otherwise. Note that our parameters are set so that E 1 · r 1 ∞ < q/5, for E 1 ←֓ χ ℓ×mE and r 1 $ ← − {0, 1} mE . This ensures that b ′ = bin(j) with overwhelming probability.
Further, as the user is active, info τ must contain w = (bin(j), w ℓ , . . . , w 1 ) and reg[j] [1] in table reg is not 0 nk . Therefore, algorithm Trace will move to the 4-th step, where it can always obtain the tuple (S 1 , E 1 , y) satisfying the conditions in (4) . By the completeness of the argument system, Π trace will be accepted by the algorithm Judge.
Security. In Theorem 1, we prove that our scheme satisfies the security requirements of the Bootle et al.'s model [7] . In the random oracle model, the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following facts:
1. The Stern-like zero-knowledge argument systems being used are simulationsound; 2. The underlying encryption scheme, which is obtained from Regev cryptosystem [45] via the Naor-Yung transformation [41] , is IND-CCA2 secure; 3. The Merkle tree accumulator we employ is secure in the sense of Definition 4; 4. For a properly generated key-pair (x, p), it is infeasible to find
The proof of Theorem 1 is established by Lemmas 2-5 given below.
Lemma 2.
Assume that the LWE n,q,χ problem is hard. Then the given FDGS scheme provides anonymity in the random oracle model.
Proof. Let A, B be PPT algorithms, act as the adversary and challenger in the games respectively. We construct a sequence of indistinguishable games, in which the first game is the experiment Exp anon−0 FDGS,A (λ) and the last one is the experiment Exp anon−1 FDGS,A (λ). We will prove the lemma by demonstrating that any two consecutive games are indistinguishable. For each i, we denote by W i the output of the adversary in game i.
Specifically, we consider the following games. Game 5: This is the same as Game 4 except that c 1 is now encryption of bin(i 1 ) while c 2 is still encryption of bin(i 0 ) for the Chal query. By the semantic security of our encryption scheme for public key (B, P 1 ) (which relies on LWE assumption), this change is negligible to the adversary. Recall that we use S 2 for the Trace queries. So the change of c 1 makes no difference to the view of the adversary. Therefore we have |Pr[
Game 6: This game follows Game 5 with one change: it switches back to use S 1 for the Trace queries and discards (S 2 , E 2 ). This modification is indistinguishable to the adversary until event F 2 , where A queries the trace oracle a valid signature (M, Π gs , c 1 , c 2 , info τ ) with c 1 , c 2 encrypting different bit strings, happens. However event F 2 breaks the simulation soundness of the argument system generating Π gs . Therefore we have |Pr[
Πgs (λ) = negl(λ). Game 7: In this game, it changes c 2 to be encryption of bin(i 1 ) for the Chal query while the remaining parts are the same as in Game 6. By the semantic security of our encryption scheme for public key (B, P 2 ), this change is negligible to the adversary. Note that we now use S 1 for the Trace queries. So changing c 2 makes no difference to the view of the adversary. Therefore we have |Pr[
Game 8: We now generate real proof for the Chal query instead of simulated proof. By the statistical zero-knowledge property of our argument system generating Π gs , the view of the adversary in Game 7 and Game 8 are statistically indistinguishable, i.e., we have Pr[ Proof. We prove non-frameability by contradiction. Suppose that A succeeds with non-negligible advantage ǫ. Then we can build a PPT algorithm B that either breaks the security of our accumulator or solves SIS ∞ n,q,m,1 problem, which are featured by A, with also non-negligible probability.
Given a matrix A from the environment that B is in, it first generates all parameters pp as we do in GSetup, then invokes A with pp, and then proceeds as described in the experiment. Here B can consistently answer all the oracle queries made by A. When A outputs (M * , Σ * , bin(j * ), Π * trace , info τ ) and wins, B does following.
Parse
, denoted as ξ * , to the hash oracle H FS with overwhelming probability. Otherwise guessing correctly this value occurs only with probability 3 −κ , which is negligible. Therefore, with probability ǫ ′ = ǫ − 3 −κ , the tuple ξ * has been an input of one hash query, denoted as t * ∈ {1, 2 · · · , Q H }, where Q H is the total number of hash queries made by A. To employ the Forking lemma of Brickell et al. [11] , B runs polynomial-number executions of A exactly the same as in the original run until the t * hash query, that is, from t * hash query on, B will answer A with fresh and independent values for hash queries on each new execution. Note that the input of t * hash query must be ξ * as in the original run. By the Forking Lemma [11] , with probability ≥ 
We have (CH
t * ,j ) = (1, 2, 3) with probability 1 − ( 7 9 ) κ for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}. Then by the argument of knowledge of the system generating Π gs , from the valid responses (RSP
such that we have: . By the correctness of our encryption scheme, c * 1 is decrypted to bin(j ′ ). The fact A wins implies algorithm Judge outputs 1. By the soundness of our system generating Π trace , bin(j * ) is decrypted from c * 1 . Hence we have bin(j ′ ) = bin(j * ) with overwhelming probability. Now we consider the following two cases: Case 1: bin(j ′ ) is a inactive user at epoch τ , i.e., the value at leaf bin(j ′ ) is 0 nk . This violates the accumulator security since we have
Case 2: bin(j * ) is an active user at epoch τ . The fact bin(j
, where x j * was initially chosen by B and satisfies A · x j * = G · p ′ mod q. Following the same argument of [30] , we claim that x j * = x ′ with probability at least 1/2. Then we find a nonzero vector z = x j * − x ′ satisfying Az = 0 mod q. Recall x j * , x ′ ∈ {0, 1} m . Thus B solves a SIS ∞ n,q,m,1 problem with non-negligible probability if A breaks the non-frameability of our construction with non-negligible probability. 
Proof.
Recall that adversary A wins traceability experiment if it generates a valid signature that either: (i) traces to an inactive user; or (ii) traces to an active user but we cannot generate a proof accepted by the algorithm Judge. We will prove that both cases occur with negligible probability.
Let (info τ , M, Σ) be the output of A in the experiment Exp trace FDGS,A (λ) and we compute (bin(j), Π trace ) by running the algorithm Trace . Parse Σ as (Π gs , c 1 , c 2 ) , where = (x, p, w τ , r 1 , r 2 ) , where
, and c 1 , c 2 are encryptions of bin(j ′ ) using randomness r 1 and r 2 . Correctness of our encryption scheme implies c 1 is decrypted to bin(j ′ ). Correct decryption of the Trace algorithm, which is run by the challenger, indicates that bin(j) is decrypted from c 1 . Hence we have bin(j ′ ) = bin(j) with overwhelming probability. Now, we note that case (i) considered above only happens with negligible probability. In fact, if bin(j) is not active at epoch τ , and TVerify A (u τ , p, w τ ) = 1 with p = 0 at leaf bin(j), then the security of our accumulator is violated. Furthermore, case (ii) also occurs with negligible probability since the challenger possesses valid witnesses to generate the proof Π trace , which will be accepted by the Judge algorithm, thanks to the completeness of the underlying argument system. It then follows that our scheme satisfies the traceability requirement. 
). The fact that the Judge algorithm outputs 1 implies that RSP i,b is a valid response w.r.t. CMT i,b and CH i,b for i ∈ [κ] and b ∈ {0, 1}. By using the extraction technique for argument system generating Π trace as in Lemma 3, we can extract the witnesses S 1,b , E 1,b , y b for b ∈ {0, 1} satisfying: . In other words, we can obtain two solutions for the equation S ⊤ · B + E = P 1 mod q, which contradicts the fact that there exists at most one solution for LWE samples (B, P 1 ).
By contradiction, we have bin(j 0 ) = bin(j 1 ) with overwhelming probability. This implies that case (i) does not hold with overwhelming probability once cases (ii),(iii) and (iv) hold. As a result, the advantage of the adversary attacking the tracing soundness of our scheme is negligible (in λ). In other words, our construction satisfies tracing soundness.
⊓ ⊔
Details of the Main Zero-Knowledge Argument System
Our protocol is a modification of the one from [30] , in which we additionally prove that p = 0 nk using the technique discussed at the beginning of Section 4. We will employ a new strategy for Stern-like protocols, suggested in [28] , which consists of unifying all the equations to be proved into just one equation of the form M · z = u mod q, for some public matrix M and vector u over Z q . This strategy will help us to deliver a simpler presentation than in [30] .
Let us first examine the equations associated with the execution of algorithm TVerify A u τ , p, ((j 1 , . . . , j ℓ ), (w ℓ , . . . , w 1 ) ) . This algorithm computes the tree path v ℓ , v ℓ−1 , . . . , v 1 , v 0 ∈ {0, 1} nk as follows: v ℓ = p and ∀i ∈ {ℓ − 1, . . . , 1, 0} :
The algorithm outputs 1 if v 0 = u τ . Observe that relation (7) can be equivalently rewritten as: ∀i ∈ {ℓ − 1, . . . , 1, 0},
In the above, we use the notation ext Given the above discussion, our protocol can be summarized as follows.
Prover's goal: Proving knowledge of secret x ∈ {0, 1} m , 0 = p ∈ {0, 1} nk , j 1 , . . . , j ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, v 1 , . . . , v ℓ−1 , w 1 , . . . , w ℓ ∈ {0, 1} nk , r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} mE , such that the following equations hold:
Now, we employ extending-then-permuting techniques for Stern-like protocols [49, 35, 30, 28] to handle the secret objects, as follows. For any positive integer i, we let S i denote the set of all permutations of i elements.
-To prove that p ∈ {0, 1} nk and p = 0 nk , we append nk − 1 "dummy" entries to p to get p * ∈ B 2nk−1 nk . Note that, for any π p ∈ S 2nk−1 , we have:
-To prove that x ∈ {0, 1} m , we append m "dummy" entries to x to get
m . Note that, for any π x ∈ S 2m , we have:
nk , respectively. We also extend r 1 , r 2 to r * 1 , r * 2 ∈ B 2mE mE , respectively. -For each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, to prove that the bit j i ∈ {0, 1} is involved in both encryption layer and Merkle tree layer, we extend it to j i = ext 2 (j i ). Then we use the following permuting technique. For bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we let T b be the permutation that transforms vector
. Note that, for any b i ∈ {0, 1}, we have:
, where ⊕ denotes the addition modulo 2. Then, to prove knowledge of j i ∈ {0, 1}, we instead prove knowledge of j i = ext 2 (j i ), by sampling b i $ ← − {0, 1} and showing the verifier that the right-hand side of the equivalence holds. Here, the crucial point is that b i acts as a "one-time pad" that perfectly hides j i . Furthermore, to prove that j i appears in a different layer of the system, we will set up a similar equivalence in that layer, and use the same b i at both places.
-Now, we have to handle the extended vectors appearing in the context after the above extensions. They are
To prove that these vector are well-formed, we will use the following permuting techniques. Let r ∈ {2nk, 2nk − 1}. For b ∈ {0, 1} and π ∈ S r , we define the permutation F b,π that transforms t = t 0 t 1 ∈ Z 2r consisting of 2 blocks of size r into φ w,1 , . . . , φ w,ℓ ∈ S 2nk , and π p ∈ S 2nk−1 :
Combining these permuting techniques with the ones described earlier, we can prove that the considered extended vectors are well-formed, with respect to the secret
Given the above transformations, we now unify all the secret objects into vector z ∈ {0, 1} D , where D = 10nkℓ + 2m + 4m E + 2ℓ − 3, of the following form (we abuse the notation of transposition):
Then, we observe that, the equations in (8) can be equivalently combined into one equation M · z = u mod q, where matrix M and vector u are built from the public input. Next, to apply the permuting techniques we have discussed above, let us define VALID as the set of all vectors in {0, 1}
D , that have the form (9) , where
nk , and there exist
nk , such that:
It can be seen that our vector z belongs to this tailored set VALID. To prove that z ∈ VALID using random permutations, let us determine how to permute the coordinates of z. To this end, we first define the set:
we let Γ η be the permutation that, when applying to vector t ∈ Z D whose blocks are as in (9) , it transforms those blocks as follows:
It now can be checked that we have the desired equivalence: For all η ∈ S,
At this point, we can now run a simple Stern-like protocol to prove knowledge of z ∈ VALID such that M · z = u mod q. The common input is the pair (M, u) , while the prover's secret input is z. The interaction between prover P and verifier V is described in Fig. 3 . The protocol employs the string commitment scheme COM from [24] that is statistically hiding and computationally binding if the SIVP O(n) problem is hard. Given vector z ′ outputted by the knowledge extractor, we can compute a tuple ζ ′ satisfying the conditions described at the beginning of this subsection, simply by "backtracking" the transformation steps we have done on the way. The protocol has communication cost O((10nkℓ + 2m + 4m E + 2ℓ − 3) log q) = O(λ · ℓ) bits. The proof of Theorem 2 employs standard simulation and extraction techniques for Stern-like protocols [24, 35, 36, 28] and is deferred to Appendix A.
Zero-Knowledge Argument of Correct Decryption
We now present the underlying ZKAoK used by the tracing manager to generate Π trace . The protocol allows the prover to prove knowledge of decryption keys for the multi-bit version of Regev's encryption scheme, as well as prove the correctness of decryption. While the argument system in Section 4.3 deals only with {0, 1} witness vectors, here, we have to handle secret vectors/matrices of infinity norm larger than 1. To this end, we will employ the decomposition technique from [35, 28] to transform them to vectors with infinity norm 1. We thus first recall this technique. 3i that have exactly i coordinates equal to j, for each j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Note that this set is "closed" under permutations, i.e., for any π ∈ S 3i and any vector x ∈ R 3 i , the following equivalence holds:
The protocol is summarized as follows. Traceability additionally demands that the adversary is not able to produce a valid signature such that opening proof is accepted by the Judge algorithm, but the denial opening proof with respect to the same user is also accepted by the DJudge algorithm.
Tracing Soundness also requires that the adversary should not be able to generate a valid signature such that the denial opening proof for the actual signer is accepted by the DJudge algorithm. 
Our Construction
As shown by Ishida et al. [22] , the main difficulty towards realizing the deniability functionality is to prove in zero-knowledge that a given ciphertext does not decrypt to a particular message. Such a mechanism is non-trivial to realize in general, but it can be done quite easily for our scheme by using the Stern-like technique for proving inequality. Let us look at the equation 
